Paul

by

The England Fire of 1974

Plain City, Weber County, Utah is not a place that conjures images of billion-dollar industries. Its name suggests modesty, and its streets deliver on that promise — quiet fields, small farms, and houses set back from roads that run straight and flat through Weber County. There is substantial residential development in the past two decades. Even then, this small town produced a remarkable concentration of American transportation entrepreneurial energy. At the center of it stands one man: Chester Rodney England.

When a fire consumed Chester’s lumber yard on the evening of 6 April 1974, his neighbors rose to defend him to allow him to rebuild. Among those neighbors were my grandparents, Milo and Gladys Ross. What they did in the weeks that followed is documented below — eight pages of signatures collected on lumber yard estimate forms, a newspaper clipping, and a typed petition text. This post tells the story behind those pages.

Chester and Maude

Chester Rodney England was born 12 November 1896 in Plain City to William and Ismelda Thueson England. He grew up there, attended Weber Academy, and in 1916 married Maude Vivian Knight — a Plain City girl herself, born in August 1897. One month after their marriage, Chester received a mission call to the Southern States. He was set apart on 5 December 1916 by Apostle Anthony W. Ivins and left his new bride on 6 December 1916, serving for two years. He returned to find Utah in the grip of the 1918 influenza epidemic, his wife under quarantine, and her sister Elizabeth Knight Ericson dead. His mother was also ill, and he spent a week with his aunt Laura England before he could be with his family.

Chester wrote his own history late in life, and his voice is direct. After the mission he worked at the Amalgamated Sugar factory, farmed through the winters, bought a small Ford truck, and began hauling produce to the stores up through Cache Valley. “I found I could make more money doing this than farming,” he wrote, “so I turned the farm back to my father.” On 24 October 1919, his first son, Eugene Knight England, was born in Ogden. On 6 March 1923, his second son, William Knight England, followed. Two daughters, Rosemary and Carol, completed the family.

Milo James Ross
Milo James Ross (1921–2014)

In 1924 the Weber Central Dairy Association organized and asked for bids to truck milk from the dairymen into the dairy on 19 Washington Boulevard in Ogden. Chester submitted his bid, was accepted, and trucked the first load. He delivered milk in the morning and hauled potatoes up through Cache Valley in the afternoon. Gene and Bill grew up in the business. During summers Chester took them along on the long hauls, building a shelf of boxes out from the cab seat so they could nap on the road. He made sure they always had a bottle of pop at each stop.

During World War II, while Gene and Bill served in the military, Chester hauled Mexican bananas coming into the country at El Paso, Texas, distributing them throughout Utah. Gene served in the 77th Infantry Division at Okinawa, earning the Bronze Star for crawling under fire to drag a wounded soldier to safety — 129 men went up to the escarpment, 27 came back after 72 hours. Bill served in the Air Force in the Philippine Islands from 1943 to 1946. The two brothers found each other on Cebu using a coded letter — Gene had written his middle initial as “B” to signal his location — and Bill arrived with a mattress, making Gene the only man in his division sleeping on something other than a canvas cot. A letter written from the Hotel Keystone in San Diego in May 1946 — Chester on the road at age 49 — gives a picture of those years on the home front. He writes to his wife about a load of bananas, his plans to buy a semi-trailer, and his satisfaction that Gene and Bill are doing well.

Shortly after their return from service, Gene and Bill joined Chester hauling produce. Their first postwar hauls included lumber from Oregon back to Utah, and it was that trade that gave the family firsthand knowledge of the lumber market. The first diesel truck — a used 1940 Kenworth conventional — was purchased during this period. As the business grew, the company also ran two packing sheds and a storage facility for Idaho potatoes at its peak. Around 1957, an unforeseen change in the potato hauling market prompted Gene and Bill to file applications for ICC licenses to haul all kinds of freight, opening an entirely new range of products and geographic lanes. That same year, C.R. England offered 72-hour coast-to-coast service, the first such offering available to American shippers. The first trip east was made by driver Robert Gould in a new 1959 Kenworth, tractor number 17, hauling produce from California to Philadelphia.

In the 1950s Chester stepped back from trucking, leaving Gene and Bill to run what had become C.R. England & Sons. He returned his attention to Plain City. As he wrote: “Our sons retired me from C.R. England & Sons so I started building homes on our property in Plain City. I soon decided I needed a lumber yard if I was going to continue to build. In 1960 I built a lumber yard on the property just west of the home we had sold.” The family’s years hauling lumber from Oregon had given Chester intimate knowledge of the lumber trade, and that knowledge informed the decision. He built three homes on adjacent property and sold them to Keith Lund, Ray Cottle, and Blaine Gibson. He built 25 homes in Plain City and many others throughout Weber County. He built a 12-unit apartment complex in Roy. He took second mortgages from young couples who could not otherwise buy. “It was a great satisfaction to have young couples come and tell me they would never have bought their homes without my help,” he wrote.

Maude was with him through all of it. Born in Plain City in August 1897, she never really left. She served as president of the Plain City Primary, held positions in the Relief Society throughout her life, and attended the Ogden Temple with Chester twice a week when they could manage it. She died in Plain City on 12 February 1982, having lived there her entire 84 years. Chester moved to Salt Lake City after her death and died there on 5 January 1989. He is buried beside her in Plain City Cemetery.

The Sugar Factory

The sugar factory was woven into both families long before the fire. The Amalgamated Sugar Company plant at Wilson Lane, just south of Plain City, was one of the economic anchors of Weber County from the early twentieth century onward. Plain City farmers hauled beets to the rail dumps each fall for decades; the railroad that came to Plain City in 1909 arrived largely to move beet cars to that factory. Chester England worked at the sugar factory himself after returning from his mission in late 1918, spending two winters there before he turned to farming and then trucking.

Milo’s father, John “Jack” Ross, worked for Amalgamated Sugar much of his adult life, following the company between its Ogden, Burley, and Paul, Idaho plants as work demanded. That movement accounts for the geography of the Ross children: Milo was born in Plain City in 1921, his brother Paul born in the town of Paul, Idaho in 1922, and Harold born in Burley in 1924. Amalgamated Sugar built its Paul factory in 1917, and families from the Plain City area followed the work north. The factory experienced difficult early years — a postwar agricultural depression after World War I, and then the beet leafhopper blight that devastated crops through the 1920s and into the 1930s — but it survived to become, in time, the largest sugarbeet processing facility in the world. Chester England and Jack Ross were contemporaries who had worked for the same company in the same corner of northern Utah before either of them had settled into the lives their families would remember them by. For more on the sugar factory’s role in Plain City’s history, see History of Plain City Pt. 1.

The Cradle of American Trucking

Chester England’s 1920 Model T purchase was the seed of something considerably larger than one family’s business. Four major American trucking companies trace their origins directly to Plain City, and all four connect back to Chester. The Standard-Examiner and C.R. England’s own history have documented this story in detail.

C.R. England & Sons grew steadily through the postwar decades into one of the largest refrigerated carriers in the United States, eventually operating a fleet approaching 4,000 trucks and headquartered in Salt Lake City. Gene England served as president of the company well into his later years, still coming into the office daily at age 88. He died on 13 November 2024 at the age of 105. Bill England, who married Fern Hadley — a Plain City Hadley, the same family that signed the petition — died on 28 March 2018 at age 95. He spent his last ten years without sight but maintained, as his family recorded, an extraordinary optimism throughout. He entitled his life history “It Is As Good As It Gets.”

Carl Moyes had driven trucks for C.R. England in his younger years. In the late 1950s, Carl and his wife Betty started B&C Truck Leasing in Plain City. In 1966, when their son Jerry graduated from Weber State College, the family moved to Phoenix, Arizona and formed the company that would eventually become Swift Transportation — for many years the largest truckload carrier in the United States. Jerry Moyes later observed that he liked to say there was “diesel in the water” in Plain City, and that the people there were conceived in sleeper cabs.

In 1990, brothers Kevin and Keith Knight and their cousins Randy and Gary Knight left Swift to found Knight Transportation. All four had grown up in Plain City and gotten their start working for the Moyes family’s Swift Transportation. The Knights were also related to Maude Knight, who had married Chester England in 1916, making them family to the man who started the Plain City trucking tradition. Knight Transportation started with five trucks; four years after going public the company had between 250 and 300. Knight and Swift announced a merger in April 2017, creating Knight-Swift Transportation, valued at an estimated $5 billion with approximately 23,000 tractors and 77,000 trailers.

In 1976, Jeff England — Gene’s oldest son and Chester’s grandson — bought his first truck while still working at C.R. England as an owner-operator, initially under the name “Pride of England Enterprises.” In 1979, with three trucks and a haul contract moving produce from California to New York, he left the family firm to go fully independent. His wife Pat was his partner from the beginning. In the early 1980s he assembled a group of investors, purchased ten more trucks, and rebranded as Pride Transport Inc. By 2017 the company operated a fleet of 500 trucks. In 2012 Jeff passed ownership to his son Jay England. Jeff England said of his decision to leave: “I felt that I needed to do my own thing.” He was 76 at the time of that interview and still driving a truck a couple of times a month.

The fuel infrastructure serving these fleets also has roots in this region. O. Jay Call, who came to Willard, Utah in the mid-1960s, founded Flying J in 1968, naming it for his love of flying, and built it into the largest retailer of diesel fuel in North America. His uncle, Reuel Call, had founded Maverik convenience stores in 1928 in Afton, Wyoming. FJ Management acquired Maverik in 2012. The Call family’s fuel network and the England-Moyes-Knight trucking empire developed in the same northern Utah environment across the same decades.

In September 2022, representatives of all four trucking firms gathered at Peery’s Egyptian Theater in Ogden for the premiere of a documentary about their shared origins. Gene England, then 102 years old, was present on stage alongside Jeff and Dan England, Jerry Moyes, and Kevin Knight.

The Fire

On the evening of 6 April 1974, Chester England went over to open up the lumber yard. He was 77 years old.

He described what followed in his own autobiography:

As I opened the office door, the place exploded and was engulfed with flames. It had been smoldering during the night. We do not know what caused it but it burned everything. I ran in to get the invoices but the ceiling began falling and burned holes in my jacket so I could have lost my life. This was a terrible experience watching everything you have worked hard for go up in flames. I was down in bed for 10 days from shock. We had insurance on it but I had been buying so much merchandise that the insurance didn’t begin to pay for the loss. I appreciated the fire department and the ward members who worked so hard to help. It took many weeks after to clean up. My family thought I should retire and not build it up again. However, I knew I wouldn’t be happy without something to do so I started rebuilding as soon as I could.

The 1977 History of Plain City records the fire at “England Builder’s Lumber Company” and gives the date as April 6, 1975. That date appears to be a transcription error in the town history; Chester’s own autobiography gives 6 April 1974, and that account is the primary source. The fire also destroyed the adjacent Leigh Archery Company, operated by LeGrande Leigh and Robert Jones. The insurance fell short. Chester was 77 and his family urged him to retire. He refused.

Plain City Will Consider Future of the Lumberyard

A newspaper clipping, attached to the first petition page, reported what happened next:

PLAIN CITY — The City Council here will hold a special session May 9 at 8 p.m. to make a decision on requests to rebuild a lumberyard and business destroyed by fire.

Requests that the city permit reconstruction of the lumberyard and Leigh Archery Co. came from Chester England and LeGrande Leigh and Robert Jones.

The council reported, however, that there have been some objections from citizens who do not want to see the lumber operation reestablished.

It also was reported there have been some questions as to the nature of the archery business being conducted. It has not been determined whether it is a commercial business or a manufacturing operation.

The requests to rebuild have been referred to the city planning commission for its recommendation. The recommendation is expected to be received prior to the May 9 meeting. All interested citizens are invited to attend the meeting which will be held in the City Hall.

The council also will consider various projects the city can carry out under the Utah Extension Service Program. Ronald Bouk of the service outlined various programs cities such as Plain City can conduct that may bring it awards and other benefits. The city must make application for such projects by May 31.

Some citizens did not want Chester to rebuild. And so his neighbors organized.

Milo and Gladys Ross

Milo and Gladys Ross
Milo and Gladys Ross, 30 May 1942

Milo James Ross (1921–2014) was born 4 February 1921 in a log cabin just north of Plain City. His mother, Ethel Sharp Ross, died of puerperal septicemia in August 1925 when Milo was four years old, leaving three surviving boys. Milo went to live with his Uncle Ed Sharp, Harold with Uncle Dale Sharp. They were raised in separate homes within a few blocks of one another in Plain City, the extended Sharp family absorbing the loss. For more on the Sharp family’s tragedies, see Sharp Tragedies.

Milo grew up working Ed Sharp’s farm — tending onions, hauling salt from the flats at Promontory, doing whatever needed doing. He played baseball with the Plain City Farm Bureau team and attended Weber High School.

Plain City baseball team
Plain City baseball team. Back (l-r): William Freestone (manager), Norman Carver, Glen Charlton, Fred Singleton, Elmer Singleton (1918–1996). Middle: Clair Folkman, Dick Skeen, Albert Sharp, Abe Maw, Milo Ross. Front: F. Skeen, Walt Moyes, Arnold Taylor, Lynn Stewart, Theron Rhead. See also: Plain City Hurler.
1937 Plain City Baseball Champions
1937 Plain City Baseball Champions. Back (l-r): Ben Van Shaar, Ervin Heslop, Ellis Stewart, Kenneth Taylor, Don Gibson, John Reese. Middle: Frank Hadley, Howard Wayment, Wayne Rose, Ray Charlton. Front: Keith Hodson, Howard Hunt, Wayne Carver, Lyle Thompson, Milo Ross.

In 1940 Milo met Gladys Maxine Donaldson (1921–2004) at a Plain City celebration. They married on 4 April 1942. Six months later Milo enlisted in the Army. He served in the 33rd Infantry Division, 130th Regiment, Company C, trained in weapons and earned expert ranking. He arrived in Hawaii on 4 July 1943 — the same day his son, Milo Paul, was born in Utah, a son he would not meet for three years. He fought through the jungles of New Guinea and the Philippines and was present at the Japanese surrender at Luzon in June 1945. He received two Purple Hearts and the Silver Star. His company received a Presidential Citation for outstanding performance during the seizure of Hill X in the Bilbil Mountain Province. For more on Milo’s military service, see Milo James Ross Military Medals and his 1997 oral history interview.

Milo Ross in uniform
Milo Ross in uniform at Fort Lewis, Washington

He came home and went to work as a contractor and builder, eventually building and remodeling hundreds of homes throughout Utah, mostly in Weber County. That work is why, when the time came to gather signatures for Chester England, he had a pad of lumber yard estimate forms at hand. They were his working tools. He pressed them into service as petition pages.

Milo knew Chester England personally. A childhood photograph survives showing Milo alongside Harold Ross, Howard Hunt, Josephine Sharp, and Janelle England on horseback — the England and Ross and Sharp children together in the neighborhood as naturally as their parents moved among one another. In his 1997 oral history interview, Milo recalled Chester among the Plain City men who had struggled during the Depression years, when banks failed and farms were lost. Chester was woven into Milo’s memory of Plain City going back to his earliest years.

On Horse l-r: Harold Ross, Howard Hunt, Milo Ross, Josephine Sharp (arm only), Janelle England, Eddie Sharp. In front l-r: Ruby Sharp, Lucille Maw, and Milo Riley Sharp.

The Petition

The typed text at the center of the petition read:

We the citizens of Plain City feel that Chester England should be allowed to rebuild his lumber yard. Since when do you kick a man when he is down/ Lets stand together and help Chester England when he needs a friend.

The headers on the petition pages identify the organizers: “By Gladys and Milo Ross — To Help Mr. England — Rebuild Back Up.” The forms were passed through the community in the weeks leading up to the May 9 city council meeting. One page was circulated by Joan Jenkins.

My father, Milo Paul Ross, had worked for Chester England as a teenager. He and his first wife, Victoria “Vicki” Feldtman (1945–2018) — married 5 March 1963 — both signed the petition. For more on Vicki, see Vicki’s Class Pictures. My grandfather Harold Ross also signed. The Sharp cousins — W.A. Sharp and Florence Sharp, children of the family that had raised Milo and Harold — signed as well. Maude K. England and Chester R. England signed the petition themselves.

Among the more than 340 signers, the connections to Plain City’s history run deep. The Moyes family signed in force — the same family whose son Carl had driven trucks for Chester England and whose grandson Jerry would found Swift Transportation. The Knights signed — relatives of Maude Knight England and future founders of Knight Transportation. Elmer Singleton (1918–1996), the Plain City baseball legend who pitched in the major leagues for five teams over fifteen years, signed with his wife Elsie. Cherrill Palmer Knight (1931–2021), who had served as Plain City City Recorder and was the daughter of Vern and Viola Palmer — also signers — added her name alongside her husband Thayne (1931–2018). Roxey R. Heslop, who contributed the school and cemetery histories to the 1977 Plain City history book, also signed. Hildor England (1896–1983), born Johnson, who married into the England family, signed as well. Gordon C. Orton (1924–2008), a Plain City general contractor and World War II veteran who served in the Philippines, New Guinea, and Okinawa, signed with his wife Leone. Vernal Moyes, who had served as a Plain City councilman, signed alongside his family.

The 1977 History of Plain City records the outcome: “Builders Bargain Center, formerly England’s Builders. This business was started and run by Chester England for many years.” Chester rebuilt. The community’s voice prevailed. For more on Plain City’s history, see the Plain City series on Sagacity.

Circle A Construction

Milo Paul Ross and Larry Aslett
Milo Paul Ross and Larry Aslett

My father’s career at Circle A Construction was built substantially on the same industry that had shaped the England and Ross families in Plain City. Circle A, founded in 1952 in Jerome, Idaho by Marvin Aslett, hauled sugar beets for Amalgamated Sugar for most of its operating history. For roughly 34 years, from around 1971 until Circle A transferred the Paul operations to AgExpress in 2004, my father supervised beet hauls across the Magic Valley, from the fields to the Amalgamated dumps at Paul and elsewhere across southern Idaho — the same plants Jack Ross had worked in a generation before.

Marvin Aslett and Milo Paul Ross
Marvin Aslett and Milo Paul Ross at Milo’s 20-year service recognition, 1990. See: Circle A Construction Honors.
Circle A truck in Paul parade
Circle A Construction truck in the Paul, Idaho parade, about 1985. See: Circle A Construction Trucks.

Marvin’s sons Larry and Steve Aslett ran the company alongside my father for decades. We called Larry “Uncle Larry” growing up. The Asletts took us to roundups in Mackay, to ranch country above White Knob. I worked for Circle A myself from 1993 through 1998. My first job in 1994 was washing and waxing trucks at the old Hynes beet dump in Paul after harvest. Jack Ross had worked for Amalgamated Sugar in Paul in the 1920s. My father hauled beets to Amalgamated in Paul for three decades. Circle A’s beet hauls fed the same company in the same town across three generations of this family’s working life.

Circle A trucks in front of Idaho Capitol
Circle A Construction trucks in front of the Idaho State Capitol, 2000

The Petition Pages

Below are all eight pages of the petition as collected by Milo and Gladys Ross in the spring of 1974.

Complete List of Signers

Names marked with an asterisk (*) represent uncertain readings of the cursive originals. Dates are given where confirmed through research. This list was transcribed from handwritten signatures; corrections and additions are welcome.

Adams, Alice
Adams, Allene C.
Adams, Calvin Rex
Allen, Jeanine
Alsup, Marguerete W.*
Alsup, Phil S.
Amussen, Doris Maw
Amussen, Richard W.
Ashdown, Rex R.
Ashdown, Virginia
Bacon, R.A.
Baker, Dean A.
Baker, Penny
Baker, Tom D.
Baker, Vivian
Beeler, Diana
Beeler, Jack
Beutler, Kandis C.
Beutler, Lloyd J.
Bingham, Dee
Bingham, Evelyn
Bingham, Farrell J.
Bingham, Junior D.
Bingham, Lorene
Bingham, Zona F.
Brown, Donna
Brown, Robert
Bullock, Duane
Bullock, Joyce W.
Bunn, Carol
Bunn, John H.
Burr, Adle R.
Burr, Arnold K.
Burr, Kenna F.
Burr, Lester
Burr, Roy D.
Butler, Donnette R.
Butler, Kenneth L.
Butterfield, Judy*
Calvert, Elaine
Calvert, Kent W.
Carver, Brent
Carver, Harold C.
Carver, Jane
Carver, Liland
Carver, Theone
Chase, Dannell
Chase, Ladd
Chase, LaRene G.
Chase, Norma P.
Child, Melvin E.
Chournas, Beverly*
Chournas, Chris*
Christensen, Barbara
Christensen, Darrell
Christensen, Ivan
Christensen, Ken
Christensen, Margaret
Christensen, Ted
Cliften, Elaine
Cliften, Robert
Close, Tom*
Cook, Dee
Cook, George
Cook, Harvey
Cook, Jennie
Cook, LaRae
Cook, Lyman H.
Corey, Dean
Corey, Fae
Costley, Elsie
Costley, Paul
Cowell, Florence
Crook, Carlene
Crook, Lane
Daley, Kenneth*
Daley, Thora
Dall, Kathie*
Davidson, Donna
Davidson, Kathy
Davidson, Marland L.
DeVries, Norm
Donaldson, Betty M.
Donaldson, David
East, Ava M.
East, Donald
East, Jimmy K.
Eddy, Beverly
Eddy, Max
Ellis, Carole
Ellis, Diana
Ellis, Donald B.
Ellis, Glen
Ellis, Janet
Ellis, Lynn
Ellis, Ray
England, Boyce
England, Chester R. (1896–1989)
England, Hildor (1896–1983)
England, Marvel S.
England, Maude K. (1897–1982)
England, Merlin
England, Mona
England, Orel W.
Eskelson, David Lon
Etherington, John E.
Etherington, Nelda
Fisher, Dorothy K.
Fisher, Robert W.
Folkman, Andrea
Folkman, Carl
Folkman, Clair
Folkman, Clara
Folkman, Cliff
Folkman, Jim
Folkman, LeRoy
Folkman, Norma
Folkman, Robert L.
Folkman, Viola
Foremaster, Bonne*
Foremaster, Pete
Fuller, Mary Lynn
Fuller, Rex
Fuhriman, Viola
Gallegos, Edith
Gee, Vilate
Giles, Lewis
Giles, Lucille
Grieve, Claramae
Grieve, Paul
Haas, Julie
Hadley, Barbara
Hadley, Connie
Hadley, Devaine
Hadley, Doug
Hadley, Gordon
Hadley, Howard
Hadley, Janet
Hadley, Karma W.*
Hadley, LaVirra*
Hadley, Lenora
Hadley, Mary Fee*
Hamp, Beth
Hansen, Gaylen G.
Hansen, Loren M.
Hansen, Nancy
Havseler/Tesseder, Christine*
Haws, Arlene
Haws, Darwin C.
Haws, Varnell
Heslop, Roxey R.
Higley, Shirley
Higley, Willard J.
Hill, Gary
Hill, Kae
Hipwell, Elmer
Hipwell, Joanne
Hipwell, Rosetta
Hobson, Connie
Hobson, Jack
Hodson, Delbert
Hodson, Lyle M.
Hodson, Mr. Ivan
Hodson, Ms. Ivan
Holmes, Doug
Holmes, Joanne
Hori, Nancy
Hori, Sam
Howard, Virgie
Howell, Kent*
Howell, Peggy J.
Hunt, Jan
Hurst, Vick*
Imlay, Nancy
Imlay, Terrence
Jackson, David W.
Jackson, George
Jackson, Mrs. George
Jackson, Mrs. Keith
Jackson, Keith
Jenkins, Ellen W.
Jenkins, Genevieve
Jenkins, Joan
Jenkins, JoAnn
Jenkins, Joyce
Jenkins, Quentin M.
Jenkins, Ronald
Jensen, Blaine R.
Jensen, Joyce
Jensen, June B.*
Jensen, Kit O.
Johansen, Barry L.
Johansen, Carol
Johnson, Judy B.
Johnson, Randy
Johnson, Rex L.
Jolly, Grace
Jolly, L.M.*
Jones, Kathy
Jones, Robert
Kapp, Clara Jean
Kapp, Leon
Kawa, Grant D.
Kelley, Bertha
Kelley, Gail
Kelley, Jesse R.
Kelley, Leona
Kennedy, Hazel
Kishimoto, Lorn
Knight, Argus*
Knight, Arson*
Knight, Cherrill (1931–2021)
Knight, Thayne E. (1931–2018)
Lakey, Dixie
Lakey, Tom
Large, Fred*
Large, Kay*
Larkin, Wade R.
Laub, William R.
Lord, Clarendon “Gene” (1929–2015)
Lord, Cline
Lund, Elizabeth
Lund, Eugene
Lund, Keith
Lund, Pearl
Mace, Rieths*
Mahoney, Kathryn
Mahnke, Eugene
Mahnke, Laura
Maw, Abram E.
Maw, Floy A.
Maw, Karen
Maw, Monna B.
Maw, Norma Jean
Maw, R. John
McFarland, Fenton
McMillan, Nola L.*
McMillan, Thomas A.*
Merrill, Paul O.*
Mikkelsen, Leo
Mikkelsen, Renee
Miller, Clarence
Miller, Ranae
Miller, Thomas A.
Miller, Veda L.
Moyes, Beverly
Moyes, Dale L.
Moyes, Edna
Moyes, Elaine
Moyes, Elbert
Moyes, Fentis*
Moyes, Ivan
Moyes, Juanita
Moyes, Kay H.
Moyes, LuJean
Moyes, Lynn V.
Moyes, Mable
Moyes, Orin
Moyes, Vernal
Nash, Augusta R.
Neff, Mr. Wayne
Neff, Ms. Wayne
North, Janet
North, Rick
Olofson, Mary L.
Olofson, Robert L.
Olsen, Ian*
Olsen, Mary
Olsen, Ron
Olsen, Yvonne
Orton, Gordon C. (1924–2008)
Orton, Leone
Overman, Curt
Painter, Cleo
Painter, Lee
Palmer, Douglas
Palmer, Lawrence
Palmer, Susanne
Palmer, Thelma H.
Palmer, Vern
Palmer, Viola (1908–2009)
Post, Bessie
Post, Judy O.
Poulsen, Bernard
Poulsen, Nora
Rasmussen, Don J.
Rasmussen, MaryLynn
Reese, J.D.
Rhead, Bonnie
Rhead, Steve
Rhead, Theron
Rhead, Vivian
Ritz, Mark
Robins, Jay*
Robins, Mildred
Robson, Amy
Roddomy, Ronald*
Rogers, Dennis O.
Rogers, Shareen
Roper, Mr. Rodney
Roper, Mrs. Rodney
Ross, Gladys (1921–2004) — organizer
Ross, Harold
Ross, Milo James (1921–2014) — organizer
Ross, Paul M.
Ross, Vicki (1945–2018)
Russell, Joe
Russell, Shirley
Sargent, Evona
Sargent, Kent
Saunders, Carl R.
Searcy, Hazel
Searcy, Kenneth J.
Seegmiller, Dale
Seegmiller, Marie F.
Sharp, Florence
Sharp, Laurel
Sharp, W.A.
Shaw, Jerrell B.
Shaw, Phyllis
Simpson, Archie W.*
Simpson, Florence
Singleton, Elmer (1918–1996)
Singleton, Elsie (–1988)
Singleton, VaCona
Skeen, Archie
Skeen, Charles
Skeen, Dick
Skeen, Lorraine
Skeen, Luella
Skeen, Wayne
Smith, LaWanna R.
Smith, Vernon J.
Sneddon, Dennis
Sorensen, Gordon A.
Sorensen, Karma
Sparks, Mildred
Stagge, Floyd
Stagge, Myrle
Statler, Lynda
Statler, Richard
Stevens, Debra
Stevens, Gwen C.
Stevens, John W.
Tafoya, Arthur
Tafoya, Via
Taylor, Alice
Taylor, Annette
Taylor, Call
Taylor, Clare
Taylor, Edna
Taylor, Elma
Taylor, Elvin L. (1920–2004)
Taylor, Elizabeth
Taylor, Fern
Taylor, Frances
Taylor, Gerald J.*
Taylor, Grant
Taylor, Idona Maw
Taylor, Jr.*
Taylor, Kathlene
Taylor, Kathy
Taylor, Ralph A.
Taylor, Rodney
Taylor, Rolla H.
Taylor, Ross M.
Taylor, Sheri
Taylor, Val
Taylor, Valoy (1932–2024)
Tesseder, Doug*
Thomas, Duane F.
Thompson, Gordon
Thompson, Lavina
Thompson, Margaret
Thompson, Marvel
Thompson, Merrvin*
Tippetts, Larry*
Truscott, L.C.
Truscott, LaVona
Valdez, Evelyn
Valdez, Raymond J.
Van Meeteren, Beth
Van Meeteren, Frank
Van Meeteren, Jean
Van Meeteren, Ron
Van Workom, Joyce*
Vaughn, Bert
Vaughn, Renee
Wakefield, Marilyn
Walton, Neale
Walton, Rhea
Weatherstone, Lorraine
West, George C.
West, Lillian
Westbrook, Herman
Weston, Becky
Weston, Brent
Weston, Eldon
Weston, Fae
Weston, Jae H.
Williams, Arnold A.
Williams, Charlotte
Williams, Delbert
Williams, F. LeRoy
Williams, Karen A.
Williams, Nadiene
Winder, Jane
Winder, Wayne
Wright, Norma

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In re Duran

Decision: In re Barbara Vanessa Duran, Case No. 14-41422-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 26 Jun. 2017)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtor: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 7 Trustee: Gary L. Rainsdon, Twin Falls, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: David W. Gadd, Worst, Fitzgerald & Stover, PLLC, Twin Falls, Idaho
Special Counsel for Trustee: Jeffrey J. Hepworth, Jeffrey J. Hepworth, P.A. & Associates, Boise, Idaho

Background

Barbara Vanessa Duran was the fifth of ten children of Enrique Duran and Alicia Rodriguez Serna. She was financially dependent on her parents until she moved out of the family home at age 19, approximately 2007.

On 24 January 2013, Duran and her mother were traveling together on Interstate 84 in Elmore County, Idaho, when their vehicle was struck by a semi tractor-trailer owned by DOT Transportation, Inc. and driven by Randolfo H. Gomez. Alicia Rodriguez Serna was killed. Barbara Duran was injured. The Duran family subsequently filed a civil action in state court against Elmore County, DOT Transportation, and Gomez, asserting claims for wrongful death and personal injuries.

On 29 December 2014, Duran filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The Court authorized the Trustee to employ special counsel to pursue the estate’s interest in the state court litigation. The civil action was eventually settled. Although the settlement documents did not allocate the proceeds between the wrongful death claim and the personal injury claim, the parties stipulated that all of the bankruptcy estate’s portion of the settlement proceeds — $5,013.19 after attorneys’ fees and costs — was attributable to the wrongful death claim. The parties further stipulated that the full amount was reasonably necessary for the support of Duran and her dependents. There was no point in fighting over whether the Debtor could prove the need for $5,000+ in funds.

On her Schedule C, Duran claimed the settlement proceeds exempt under Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c). The Trustee filed an objection, later superseded by an amended objection, contending that Duran did not qualify for the exemption.

The Trustee’s Objection

The Trustee’s objection turned on a single question of statutory interpretation: whether Duran qualified as a “dependent” of her mother for purposes of Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c). That provision exempts proceeds of a settlement accruing as a result of “the wrongful death or bodily injury of another individual of whom the individual was or is a dependent.” The parties stipulated that Duran had not been a dependent of her mother — as that term is defined in Idaho Code § 11-601(2) as “an individual who derives support primarily from another individual” — since she left the family home at age 19, approximately six years before her mother’s death.

The Trustee argued through two rounds of briefing that this undisputed gap in dependency was fatal to the exemption claim. Relying on In re Hendrickson, 274 B.R. 138 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002), which had construed an analogous federal exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(11)(B), the Trustee contended that three possible interpretations existed for the phrase “was or is a dependent”: the debtor must have been a dependent before the decedent’s death, at the time of death, or after the death. The Hendrickson court rejected the first alternative as “too broad and all-encompassing,” concluding that it would lead to absurd results — including allowing a 70-year-old to exempt wrongful death proceeds from the death of a 90-year-old parent despite having been independent for fifty years. The Trustee urged the Court to adopt the same reasoning and require that Duran have been a dependent of her mother at the time of or following her mother’s death. Because Duran conceded she met neither standard, the Trustee argued the exemption should be disallowed.

The Trustee also argued, in the alternative, that even if a petition-date standard governed, the result was the same: Duran was not a dependent of her mother on the date she filed her bankruptcy petition.

The Debtor’s Response

Debtor’s counsel filed both an initial response and a later memorandum in support of the exemption, arguing that the plain language of Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c) compelled allowance of the claim.

Counsel argued that the statute means exactly what it says: the exemption is available to an individual who “was or is a dependent” of the decedent, with no temporal limitation on when that dependency must have existed. The word “was” is unqualified — nothing in the statute restricts it to dependency at the time of death, near the time of death, or at any particular moment. There was no question that Duran had been a dependent of her mother from birth through age 19, satisfying the “was” prong of the statute on its face.

Counsel further argued that the Hendrickson court’s conclusion that the broad reading produced an “absurd” result was not persuasive under Idaho law. Idaho’s wrongful death statute, Idaho Code § 5-311, permits any heir or personal representative to bring a wrongful death action without requiring dependency on the decedent at the time of death. Construing the parallel exemption statute with the same breadth was therefore not palpably absurd — it was consistent with the legislature’s evident intent to provide broad protection for wrongful death recoveries received by family members. An 80-year-old bringing a wrongful death action for the death of a 110-year-old ancestor under Idaho Code § 5-311 would not be considered an absurd result; the exemption for a former dependent receiving wrongful death proceeds should be treated no differently.

Counsel also distinguished the Trustee’s petition-date argument on structural grounds. Idaho Code § 11-604 is not limited to bankruptcy proceedings. Reading the word “was” as a reference to the bankruptcy filing date would impose a bankruptcy-specific limitation that the legislature did not write into the statute. Moreover, because wrongful death claims are captured under the bankruptcy estate only if they arose before filing under 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), the death will always precede the petition — meaning under the Trustee’s reading, the debtor could never currently be a dependent of a deceased person, rendering the exemption a nullity in every wrongful death case.

Finally, counsel invoked the Idaho Court’s own prior decision in In re Baldwin, 12-40060-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho 2012), in which the Court had entertained the possibility that a divorced spouse might qualify as a former dependent under § 11-604(1)(c), and had not confined “was a dependent” to the time of the bodily injury.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Pappas overruled the Trustee’s amended objection and allowed the exemption in full.

The Court began with the governing principles of Idaho statutory construction: the plain meaning of a statute controls, exemption statutes are to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor, and courts must give effect to all words of a statute rather than render any term superfluous. Beginning with the text of Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c), the Court noted that the phrase “was or is a dependent” is not grammatically linked to any particular point in time. The use of both past and present tense reflects the legislature’s intent to cover both former and current dependents — nothing in the text restricts “was” to dependency at or near the time of the decedent’s death.

The Court drew on its own earlier decision in In re Baldwin, which had considered whether the past-tense “was” might be linked grammatically only to the wrongful death prong of the statute — i.e., applicable only when the injured person has died. The Court had declined to read that limitation into the statute in Baldwin, and declined to do so again here. Inserting punctuation or structural limitations that the legislature did not include would be judicial rewriting, not statutory interpretation.

The parties had stipulated that Duran was a dependent of her mother from birth until age 19. That was sufficient. The statute does not require that the dependency be recent, ongoing, or proximate in time to the decedent’s death. The Court acknowledged the Trustee’s concern that this reading might produce unfair results in extreme cases — such as a decades-removed former dependent claiming a windfall exemption — but observed that this was a question of legislative policy, not statutory interpretation. No contrary legislative purpose had been shown. And because the debtor must still demonstrate that the settlement funds are reasonably necessary for support — a requirement the parties had stipulated was met here — allowing a former dependent to claim the exemption cannot be characterized as an absurd result.

A separate order was entered the same day overruling the Trustee’s amended objection and allowing Debtor’s exemption claim in full.

Why This Matters

  1. “Was or is a dependent” in Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c) includes former dependents without temporal limitation. The Court’s holding is clear: a debtor who was ever a dependent of the decedent satisfies the dependency requirement of the exemption, regardless of how long ago that dependency existed. Idaho practitioners advising debtors with wrongful death claims should be aware that a childhood dependency relationship — even one that ended years or decades before the decedent’s death — is sufficient to invoke the exemption.

  2. Courts will not judicially insert temporal limitations the legislature did not write. Both the Trustee and the Court acknowledged that the broad reading might produce results that feel inequitable in extreme cases. The Court nevertheless refused to rewrite the statute. Where the Idaho legislature intended to impose a time-of-death dependency requirement, it knew how to do so — and it did not do so here. Practitioners should not assume that policy-based arguments about unintended windfalls will overcome unambiguous statutory text.

  3. The “reasonably necessary for support” requirement remains a meaningful check. The exemption under Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c) is not unlimited. Even a qualifying former dependent must demonstrate that the settlement proceeds are reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and dependents. In this case, the parties stipulated to that fact. Where facts are less favorable, the Trustee retains the ability to contest the support element even if dependency is conceded.

  4. Idaho’s wrongful death statute informs the scope of the parallel exemption. Counsel’s argument that Idaho Code § 5-311 permits any heir to bring a wrongful death action without proof of current dependency resonated with the Court’s broad reading of the exemption. Practitioners constructing arguments under Idaho Code § 11-604(1)(c) should consider the parallel scope of the underlying wrongful death statute when framing the legislative-intent analysis.

  5. A petition-date dependency standard would render the wrongful death exemption a nullity. Debtor’s counsel identified a decisive structural flaw in the Trustee’s petition-date argument: because a wrongful death claim only enters the bankruptcy estate if the death preceded the filing, the decedent will always already be dead by petition day — meaning the debtor can never currently be a dependent of the deceased person. Reading “is” out of the analysis and confining “was” to the petition date would effectively eliminate the wrongful death prong of the exemption entirely, producing an absurd result that courts must avoid.


Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 14-41422-JDP, Doc. 78 (Bankr. D. Idaho 26 Jun. 2017)

Memorandum DecisionDownload
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In re DeVries

Decision: In re Relna James DeVries and Kathryn Lee DeVries, Case No. 13-41591-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 28 Apr. 2015)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtors: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: Holly Roark, Office of Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho

Background

Relna and Kathryn DeVries filed a Chapter 13 petition on 27 December 2013. Their amended plan, confirmed on 19 May 2014, provided that all allowed tax claims would be paid in full. The IRS timely filed a proof of claim for taxes owed for the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The deadline for governmental units to file proofs of claim was 25 June 2014.

The Debtors filed their 2013 federal income tax returns in April 2014, which showed they owed $1,021 to the IRS for the 2013 tax year. The Idaho Tax Commission filed its own proof of claim for the $84 in state taxes owed for 2013 the day after plan confirmation. The IRS, however, did not file a claim for the 2013 federal taxes, nor did it amend its existing claim to include them. Within 30 days of the 25 June 2014 governmental bar date — as permitted by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 — the Debtors filed a proof of claim on behalf of the IRS for the $1,021 in 2013 taxes.

The Trustee’s Objection

The Trustee objected to the Debtors’ proof of claim. The Trustee represented that it was allegedly filed at the IRS’s own request, and that the IRS did not wish to have the 2013 tax debt paid through the plan as a § 1305 claim.

The Trustee’s objection rested on 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), which governs postpetition claims in Chapter 13 cases. That provision permits a proof of claim to be filed by “any entity that holds a claim against the debtor … for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending.” The Trustee argued that the Debtors’ 2013 federal income taxes became payable during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, making them a § 1305 postpetition claim, and that under the plain language of § 1305 only the creditor holding the claim — the IRS — was authorized to file a proof of claim for it. The Debtors’ attempt to file on the IRS’s behalf was therefore improper and the claim should be disallowed in its entirety.

The Debtors’ Response

Debtors filed a response through their counsel arguing that the 2013 tax debt was properly treated as a prepetition claim and that they were authorized to file the proof of claim under § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004.

Debtors did not rely on § 1305 as their filing authority. Instead, they argued that the 2013 tax obligation was a prepetition claim — or should be treated as one — and that the ordinary debtor claim-filing mechanism of § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 therefore applied. On the question of when the claim arose, Debtors urged the Court to apply the “fair contemplation” or “prepetition relationship” test articulated in In re Dixon, 295 B.R. 226 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003). Under that approach, a claim arises prepetition if there was a prepetition relationship between the debtor and the creditor such that a possible claim was within the creditor’s fair contemplation at the time of filing. The IRS and the Debtors had precisely such a relationship: the Debtors were taxpayers, the IRS was their taxing authority, and 361 of the 365 days of the 2013 tax year had elapsed before the petition was filed. The IRS’s claim for 2013 taxes was fully within its fair contemplation at the time of filing, Debtors argued, making it a prepetition claim subject to the ordinary rules permitting debtors to file on a creditor’s behalf.

Debtors also invoked 11 U.S.C. § 502(i), which provides that a postpetition claim for taxes entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8) shall be treated as if it had arisen before the petition date. On that theory, even if the 2013 taxes technically arose postpetition, § 502(i) mandated that they be treated as prepetition claims, restoring the Debtors’ authority to file under § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004.

The Trustee’s Reply

The Trustee replied that Ninth Circuit authority resolved the question directly and foreclosed the Michigan court’s “fair contemplation” test. Relying on Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009), the Trustee argued that taxes owed for a given tax year do not “become payable” — and therefore do not arise as a § 1305 postpetition claim — until the close of that tax year. Because the DeVries filed their petition before the close of 2013, the 2013 taxes became payable only after the petition date and were a postpetition claim that only the IRS could properly file. The Trustee further noted that allowing the improperly filed claim would prejudice general unsecured creditors, whose pro-rata distributions would be reduced by the addition of a priority tax claim.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Pappas sustained the Trustee’s objection and disallowed the Debtors’ proof of claim in its entirety.

The Court addressed § 502(i) first and found it dispositive against the Debtors. Section 502(i) applies only to postpetition tax claims entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), which affords priority to income taxes for which the applicable return was due within three years before the petition date. The DeVries’ 2013 federal income tax return was not due until 15 April 2014 — after their 27 December 2013 petition date. Because the return due date fell outside the three-year lookback period, the 2013 taxes were not entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and § 502(i) therefore had no application. The Court drew support from the Ninth Circuit BAP’s analysis in In re Jones, 420 B.R. 506 (9th Cir. BAP 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 657 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2011), which explained that a postpetition income tax obligation whose return is due postpetition cannot invoke priority status under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) and thus falls outside § 502(i)’s reach entirely.

The Court then turned to § 1305(a)(1) and rejected the Debtors’ “fair contemplation” argument. Binding Ninth Circuit precedent, not the Michigan court’s test, controlled the analysis. Under In re Joye, taxes become “payable” for purposes of § 1305(a)(1) when they are “capable of being paid.” The Ninth Circuit further established in In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995), that a tax on income is “incurred” on the last day of the income period. Because federal income taxes are assessed by the calendar year, the DeVries’ 2013 taxes were incurred at midnight on 31 December 2013 — after the petition was filed. Both the incurrence and the payability of the 2013 taxes therefore occurred postpetition, placing them squarely within § 1305(a)(1).

The Court also examined the interplay between § 502(i) and § 1305(a)(1) as analyzed in In re Joye, which drew on Collier on Bankruptcy for the proposition that § 502(i) applies to taxes incurred prepetition that do not come due until after the petition is filed, while taxes incurred postpetition can be treated only as postpetition claims under § 1305. Because the 2013 taxes were incurred postpetition under the Pacific-Atlantic rule, § 502(i) offered the Debtors no relief in any event.

Having concluded that the 2013 taxes were a § 1305(a)(1) postpetition claim, the Court applied the well-established rule that postpetition claims under § 1305 may be offered for inclusion in a Chapter 13 plan only by the creditor that holds the claim. A debtor has no authority to force a postpetition creditor into the plan by filing a proof of claim on its behalf. The Trustee’s objection was sustained and the Debtors’ proof of claim disallowed.

Why This Matters

  1. Section 502(i) does not reach postpetition taxes whose returns are due postpetition. The provision applies only to taxes entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) — which requires the return to have been due within three years before the petition date. An income tax return due after the petition date falls outside that window entirely. Practitioners should not assume § 502(i) will bridge the gap between a postpetition tax liability and prepetition claim treatment.

  2. The Ninth Circuit’s “capable of being paid” standard governs when taxes become payable in the Ninth Circuit. Under In re Joye, the relevant inquiry for § 1305(a)(1) purposes is when the tax was capable of being paid — and under In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., income taxes are incurred on the last day of the tax year. A tax year that closes after the petition date produces a postpetition claim regardless of how many days of that year preceded the filing.

  3. Only the creditor may file a § 1305 postpetition claim. Section 1305(a) grants the right to file a proof of claim for postpetition taxes exclusively to the entity that holds the claim. A debtor cannot invoke § 501(c) or Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 to file on a creditor’s behalf where the underlying obligation is a § 1305 postpetition claim rather than a prepetition one. The creditor’s silence is the creditor’s choice to make.

  4. The IRS may decline plan treatment of a postpetition tax debt. This case illustrates that § 1305 is entirely creditor-driven. The Trustee’s objection represented that the IRS allegedly sought disallowance of the Debtors’ filing rather than simply declining to participate. A Chapter 13 debtor who owes postpetition taxes has no mechanism to compel inclusion of that debt in the plan over the IRS’s objection.

  5. Debtors who owe taxes for a year that closes after their petition date should address the liability outside the plan. Where postpetition income taxes cannot be included in a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, the debt remains the debtor’s obligation to manage directly with the taxing authority. Counsel should advise clients of this reality at the outset and account for ongoing tax obligations in assessing the feasibility of the plan.


Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 13-41591-JDP, Doc. 57 (Bankr. D. Idaho 28 Apr. 2015)

DecisionDownload
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Lincoln County Courthouse

Lincoln County Idaho Courthouse

Lincoln County is closer to me so I get there more often. Shoshone is the Lincoln County seat. Minidoka County was created out of Lincoln County, so many of the Minidoka cities were incorporated in Lincoln County. This includes the cities of Heyburn, Minidoka, Paul, and Rupert. Acequia is the only city incorporated after the creation of Minidoka County.

This photo is from 2023. The Lincoln County Courthouse has been under renovation, so the last time I had court I attended in the old Wells Fargo Bank building. I will have to get an updated picture next time I am in Lincoln County.

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In re Sprague

Decision: In re Jarred A. Sprague and Elizabeth J. Sprague, Case No. 12-41099-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 18 December 2013)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtors: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: Alexandra O. Caval, Meridian, Idaho

Background

Jarred and Elizabeth Sprague filed a Chapter 13 petition on 2 August 2012. Their plan was confirmed on 12 October 2012, and the bar date for non-governmental creditors to file proofs of claim passed on 3 December 2012. Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”) 3004, the Debtors or Trustee had an additional 30 days — until 2 January 2013 — to file a proof of claim on behalf of any creditor that failed to do so.

The debt at issue arose in May 2009, when U.S. Bank closed Ms. Sprague’s bank account after a scam check deposited into the account bounced. Neither U.S. Bank nor its collection assignee, National Law Group (“NLG”), reported the resulting deficiency to any credit reporting agency, and neither contacted Ms. Sprague after the account was closed. When the Debtors compiled their bankruptcy schedules, they relied heavily on their credit reports — which showed no debt to U.S. Bank — and the obligation was omitted entirely from their filings.

In August 2013 — more than a year after the bar date — NLG contacted Ms. Sprague’s employer seeking to collect. Upon learning of the omitted debt, the Debtors promptly amended Schedule F to list U.S. Bank and NLG as creditors, served them with notice of the bankruptcy, and filed a motion to enlarge the time to file a proof of claim on their behalf under FRBP 3004 and FRBP 9006(b)(1).

The Trustee’s Objection

Trustee objected on several grounds. First, she argued the Debtors had not met the “excusable neglect” standard required under FRBP 9006(b)(1) to justify enlarging the FRBP 3004 deadline after its expiration. Relying on In re Schuster, 428 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010) — the only reported decision she could locate addressing this precise issue — the Trustee argued that the Debtors’ reason for delay was insufficient, as the account closure in 2009 should have put Ms. Sprague on notice that a claim might exist.

Second, the Trustee argued that granting the motion would prejudice the existing pool of unsecured creditors, who held approximately $37,894 in claims and whose pro-rata distributions would be reduced by the addition of a new creditor more than a year into the plan. She further contended that the omitted creditor itself would be prejudiced because its debt would be discharged upon plan completion — a result she argued was impermissible under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(3), which exclude from Chapter 13 discharge debts that are neither listed nor scheduled in time to permit a timely proof of claim.

The Debtors’ Brief

Debtors filed a detailed brief through their counsel addressing each of the Trustee’s arguments.

On the procedural question, Debtors’ counsel confirmed that FRBP 3004’s deadline, unlike FRBP 3002(c)’s creditor bar date, is not enumerated in FRBP 9006(b)(3)’s list of deadlines that can only be extended under their own specific conditions. FRBP 9006(b)(1) therefore applies, and the Court may enlarge the FRBP 3004 deadline upon a showing of excusable neglect.

On excusable neglect, Debtors distinguished Schuster on its facts. In Schuster, the debtor had purchased appliances on credit — physical items that provided tangible, ongoing reminders of an unpaid debt — yet still claimed to have forgotten the obligation. Here, by contrast, the Debtors had no collateral, no invoices, no collection contacts, and no credit report entry to put them on notice. Ms. Sprague did not merely forget a debt she knew existed — she was genuinely unaware that any debt was owed. Upon learning of it, she and her husband acted immediately. Debtors’ counsel also identified three unreported decisions from the District of Utah in which courts had granted similar enlargements under comparable circumstances.

On the Trustee’s standing to seek a non-dischargeability determination, Debtors argued that the Trustee lacked both constitutional and prudential standing to raise a dischargeability objection on behalf of a specific creditor. Dischargeability is a particularized right belonging to the individual creditor, not a general estate matter the Trustee may assert.

On dischargeability itself, Debtors argued that § 523(a)(3) would not apply if the Court granted the enlargement. If the time to file a proof of claim on behalf of NLG were enlarged under FRBP 9006(b)(1), the claim would be deemed timely filed under FRBP 3004, included in the plan’s pro-rata distribution to general unsecured creditors, and “provided for” under the plan within the meaning of § 1328(a). The harm § 523(a)(3) is designed to prevent — a creditor being denied both payment and discharge — would not exist.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Pappas granted the Debtors’ motion in its entirety. Applying the four-factor equitable test from Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Court found that each factor weighed in the Debtors’ favor.

On prejudice, the Court found the impact on other unsecured creditors to be minimal. The omitted claim was approximately $1,500 in a pool of roughly $37,894 in unsecured debt — a modest reduction in pro-rata distributions that no creditor had objected to. As for the omitted creditor itself, the Court found it would actually benefit from having its claim filed and paid, rather than being left entirely outside the plan.

On the length and reason for delay, the Court found the delay understandable and outside the Debtors’ reasonable control. The creditor had made no contact for over four years, reported nothing to credit agencies, and provided no basis for the Debtors to know the debt existed. Upon learning of it, the Debtors acted promptly.

On good faith, the Court found no basis to question it — a conclusion the Trustee herself did not dispute.

The Court also expressly disagreed with the Trustee’s dischargeability argument, declining to follow Schuster on that point. Because the Court was enlarging the time to file a proof of claim under 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) and FRBP 3004 and 9006(b)(1), the creditor’s claim would be treated as timely filed. The Court doubted that §§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(3)(A) compelled a contrary result under those circumstances, though it declined to rule definitively on the discharge issue as it was not formally before it.

The Order gave the Debtors fourteen days from 18 December 2013 to file the proof of claim for U.S. Bank.

Why This Matters

1. FRBP 9006(b)(1) can enlarge the FRBP 3004 deadline. Unlike the creditor bar date under FRBP 3002(c) — which is expressly restricted from enlargement except under its own terms by FRBP 9006(b)(3) — FRBP 3004’s debtor/trustee claim-filing window is not enumerated in FRBP 9006(b)(3). Courts therefore retain discretion to enlarge it upon a showing of excusable neglect. This is a critical distinction practitioners must understand when an omitted creditor surfaces mid-case.

2. Excusable neglect is highly fact-specific. The contrast between this case and Schuster illustrates how much the reason for delay matters in the excusable neglect analysis under Pioneer. A debtor who genuinely lacked knowledge of a debt — with no collateral, no billing, and no credit report entry — is in a materially different position than one who simply forgot about a known obligation.

3. Acting promptly upon discovery is essential. The Debtors’ immediate response — amending their schedules, serving the creditor, and filing the motion — was central to the Court’s good faith finding. Delay after discovery would have significantly weakened the equitable case for enlargement.

4. The Trustee lacks standing to raise dischargeability on behalf of a single creditor. A Chapter 13 trustee does not have constitutional or prudential standing to seek a dischargeability determination on behalf of a specific creditor. That creditor’s own silence — it filed no objection — reinforced the point.

5. Timely filing cures the § 523(a)(3) problem. Where a court enlarges the FRBP 3004 deadline and the debtor files a proof of claim on the omitted creditor’s behalf, that claim becomes timely for plan purposes. The debt is then “provided for” under § 1328(a), resolving the non-dischargeability concern under § 523(a)(3). Inclusion in the plan is the better outcome for all parties.

Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 12-41099-JDP, Doc. 54 (Bankr. D. Idaho 18 December 2013)
Order Granting Motion: Doc. 55 (Bankr. D. Idaho 18 December 2013)

Enlargement MemorandumDownload
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Preston England Dedication Handkerchief

Preston England Temple Dedication Handkerchief

On 5 April 2020, I had to go digging to find my Hosanna Shout Handkerchief. It was the 200th Anniversary of the First Vision of Joseph Smith Jr. and President Russell M. Nelson had indicated we would be having a Hosanna Shout the day before to honor and celebrate. At some point on that day I snapped this picture of my handkerchief.

This handkerchief was given to me in Runcorn, England by John and Rose Byrom. It had been used in the Hosanna Shout for the Preston England Temple Dedication. I do not know who it belonged to or why it was being given to some missionary from Idaho, but I gladly accepted it. I got to use it for the first time on 8 October 2000 in the Manchester England Stake Center for the dedication of the Conference Center in Salt Lake City, Utah. Several days later I recall my companion, Elder Gheorghe Simion, telling me that during the night he heard me muttering the Hosanna Shout in my sleep. Later, again, we were in the car and he told me I should stop saying the Hosanna Shout under my breath. I had not realized I was doing it. But I do catch myself once and a while repeating its words to myself on particular occasions. It is deeply entrenched in my soul.

As I sat thinking about this handkerchief in 2020, I was thinking about all the occasions on which I have had the privilege of using it since then. For a record, I thought I better list the dates this handkerchief was used for a Hosanna Shout. I have updated it even for additional uses since 2020, particularly in dedicating our own Burley Idaho Temple.

Preston England Temple – 7-10 June 1998 – Preston England Temple, Chorley, England. I did not use it, someone else did.

Conference Center – 8 October 2000 – Manchester Stake Center, Altrincham, England.

Winter Quarters Nebraska Temple – 22 April 2001 – Branson Chapel, Branson, Missouri.

Nauvoo Illinois Temple – 27 June 2002 – Branson Chapel, Branson, Missouri.

Boise Idaho Temple – 18 November 2012 – Paul Idaho Stake Center – Paul, Idaho.

Provo City Utah Temple – 20 March 2016 – Kaysville Utah South Stake Center, Kaysville, Utah.

Idaho Falls Idaho Temple – 4 June 2017 – Burley West Idaho Stake Center, Burley, Idaho.

Meridian Idaho Temple – 19 November 2017 – Burley West Idaho Stake Center, Burley, Idaho.

Palm Sunday – 5 April 2020 – Ross Home, 819 Fairmont Street, Burley, Idaho.

Pocatello Idaho Temple – 7 November 2021 – American Falls Idaho Stake Center, American Falls, Idaho.

Layton Utah Temple – 16 June 2024 – Kaysville Columbia Heights, Kaysville 11th, and Spencer Wards Building, Kaysville, Utah.

Burley Idaho Temple – 11 January 2026 – Burley Idaho Central Stake Center, Burley, Idaho.

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In re Champ

Decision: In re Richard M. Champ and Helen B. Champ, Case No. 08-40272-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 19 Aug. 2013)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtors: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho

Background

Richard and Helen Champ filed a Chapter 13 petition on 8 April 2008, represented by attorney Emil F. Pike, Jr. Their plan was confirmed in October 2008, requiring monthly payments of $910 over sixty months toward $53,019.09 in unsecured debt. The confirmation order included a specific provision reflecting that Mrs. Champ had a pending Social Security disability claim: if she were awarded benefits, the Debtors were required to file an amended Schedule I to disclose that income.

The Debtors faithfully made plan payments for nearly five years — even through a period in which Mr. Champ suffered a heart attack and the Trustee extended the payment period to allow them to catch up. By the time this dispute arose, only approximately $1,130 remained unpaid under the Plan.

The Trustee’s Motion

In March 2013 — nearly two years after learning of the Social Security award from the Debtors’ 2011 tax return — McCallister filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Debtors had failed to comply with the confirmation order by not amending their schedules to disclose Mrs. Champ’s Social Security lump sum award of $37,914.40 and her ongoing monthly benefit of $1,038.90. The Trustee argued the award remained property of the estate and demanded either dismissal or a turnover of approximately $25,600 to pay creditors in full.

The Objection

The Debtors engaged new counsel — Paul Ross with Idaho Bankruptcy Law — and filed a substantive objection raising several important points.

First, the Debtors’ original attorney, Emil Pike, had passed away in April 2010, leaving them without legal guidance at the precise moment they needed it most. When Mrs. Champ received the Social Security award in mid-2011, the Debtors did what they understood to be appropriate — they called the Trustee’s office. A factual dispute arose over what was communicated: the Trustee believed the Debtors were asking about a payoff and were told to contact an attorney; the Debtors believed they were simply told to keep making plan payments. Either way, their outreach demonstrated good faith, not an intent to conceal.

Second, new counsel promptly filed amended Schedules B, C, and I to address all disclosure deficiencies, including the Social Security lump sum, the ongoing monthly benefit, and a previously undisclosed $92 monthly Lamb Weston pension payment to Mrs. Champ.

Third, and critically as a legal matter, Social Security benefits are excluded from the calculation of a debtor’s current monthly income under 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A)(B) following BAPCPA. As such, the Social Security award would not have increased the Debtors’ required plan payments regardless of when it was disclosed. The Trustee’s demand for a $25,600 turnover had no statutory basis.

The objection also raised alternative relief: modification of the plan under § 1329 to reduce any remaining payment obligation to zero given the Debtors’ reduced income and medical hardships, or alternatively, a hardship discharge under § 1328(b) given that the plan shortfall was attributable to circumstances beyond the Debtors’ control — specifically, the death of their attorney and Mr. Champ’s serious medical issues.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Pappas denied the Trustee’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. While acknowledging that the Debtors technically failed to comply with the confirmation order, the Court exercised its discretion under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c) — which uses the permissive “may” rather than the mandatory “shall” — and weighed the totality of the circumstances carefully.

The Court’s analysis turned on several key findings:

  • The death of the Debtors’ attorney left them without guidance at a pivotal moment, and their confusion about compliance was understandable given that circumstance
  • The Debtors’ phone call to the Trustee’s office and their voluntary provision of their 2011 tax return — which disclosed the Social Security income — demonstrated that they were not attempting to conceal anything
  • The Debtors had substantially completed five years of plan payments; denying them a discharge at that stage would be a disproportionately harsh sanction
  • Under post-BAPCPA law, Social Security income is excluded from current monthly income under § 101(10A)(B), meaning the award would not have changed the Debtors’ payment obligations in any event — a point recently confirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Drummond v. Welsh (In re Welsh), 711 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2013)
  • The undisclosed Lamb Weston pension of $92 per month, while a concern, was too minor an omission to override five years of consistent plan compliance

The Court declined to consider the alternative requests for plan modification or hardship discharge raised in the objection, noting those would need to be raised by proper motion with appropriate notice — but the dismissal motion itself was denied, clearing the path for the Debtors to receive their discharge.

Why This Matters

1. Disclosure obligations are ongoing and binding. Confirmed plans create court orders, and debtors must comply with them throughout the life of the case — not just at the point of confirmation. A change in financial circumstances mid-case requires prompt attention.

2. Attorney death mid-case creates real risk for clients. When counsel passes away during a long Chapter 13 plan, clients are left without guidance precisely when they may need it most. Practitioners and courts alike should be attentive to these situations, and successor counsel should audit compliance with the confirmation order from the outset.

3. Social Security income is excluded from disposable income calculations post-BAPCPA. While SS income must be disclosed on Schedule I, it does not factor into a debtor’s projected disposable income under § 1325(b), and — as confirmed in In re Welsh — it cannot be considered in a good faith analysis under § 1325(a). The Trustee’s demand for a $25,600 turnover in this case was legally untenable.

4. Dismissal under § 1307(c) is discretionary. Courts are not required to dismiss even upon a finding of material default. Where debtors have acted in good faith, made substantial plan payments, and the equities weigh against dismissal, courts retain and will exercise broad discretion to deny the motion.

5. Good faith communication matters. The Debtors’ efforts — calling the Trustee’s office, providing tax returns, engaging new counsel promptly — were central to the Court’s finding that no intent to evade existed. Documented communication with the Trustee’s office, even if informal, can be meaningful evidence in contested dismissal proceedings.

Full Decision: Case No. 08-40272-JDP, Doc. 72 (Bankr. D. Idaho 19 Aug. 2013)

Memorandum of DecisionDownload
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Burley Idaho Temple Open House

The Burley Idaho Temple Open House ran 3 November 2025 to 22 November 2025. It was an amazing opportunity to invite the local and broader community to walk through a pinnacle of our worship. I attended 5 of the much more individual and personal tours on the 3rd through 5th with public leaders and distinguished guests. I wish everyone could attend these tours, which would often take 45 minutes to 60 minutes for the full tour. Some of these were guided by General Authorities, including Elders Steven R. Bangerter, Karl D. Hirst, and K. Brett Nattress.

On Thursday, the general public was welcome to attend open tours. Our first tour tried to do a small introduction in each room, but about half-way through that was abandoned to keep the lines moving. Every tour I attended afterward did not have any attempted presentations, other than to remind individuals to not take photos and to speak softly.

Amanda sneaked over and caught a personal tour on the 6th.

6 November 2025 – Amanda Ross attended individually

Amanda and I took our family on Friday 7 November 2025.

Saturday morning we attended with some friends. This was my 7th tour that first week!

8 November 2025 – Bud and Karen Marie Whiting, Amanda Ross, James Ross, Aliza Ross, Lea Pierucci Izama, Audra Hales, Aleah Hales, Anson Hales, Brad Hales, Paul Ross

The next weekend, Amanda had a bunch of family come to town and also attend. This Friday night was my 4th tour of the second week.

14 November 2025 – Hiram Ross, Amanda Ross, Lillian Ross, Rowan Hemsley, Margo Hemsley, Bryan Hemsley, Olivia Hemsley, Jill Hemsley, Jack Hemsley, James Ross, Paul Ross, Aliza Ross, Jordan Hemsley, Derek Hemsley

I also got to attend some more times the third week. But my 4th tour in the third week was with my sister and brother-in-law.

22 November 2025 – Paul Ross, Andra and Wes Herbst

That makes 15 trips through the temple for the open house. I was also privileged to do temple security on 5 different occasions, all for the 9:00 PM to 1:00 AM shift. Here are some photos from that opportunity.

4 November 2025
4 November 2025
5 November 2025 – Paul Ross and Kevin Mower for the graveyard shift
10 November 2025 – Paul Ross and Tyson Smith for the graveyard shift

Amanda also got to do a security shift, parking shift, and foot covering (booty) shift.

12 November 2025 – Amanda Ross Parking Shift
12 November 2025 – Amanda Ross Security Shift

Some of the late night security shifts were great opportunities to reflect on the blessings we are now achieving with the ease and access of a temple so close.

When I received my first temple recommend for my own endowment, Paul Idaho Stake President, M. Gene Hansen, invited me to make a commitment to attend the temple every month at a minimum. I took that commitment. I agreed.

In Hazelton, Idaho, it took me roughly 2 1/4 hours to get to the Boise Idaho Temple (speed limits have increased since then); Idaho Falls Idaho Temple was just under 2 hours; Logan Utah Temple was about 2 1/2 hours, and Ogden Utah Temple was 2 1/2 hours. I was endowed in Logan in September 1998 with my Dad. I attended Logan and Boise before going on the mission. But it was at least half a day planning to attend the temple before the mission.

Within the Manchester England Mission is found the Preston England Temple. Attending the temple in the mission required coordination with members as the temple isn’t near public transportation and we relied on members to take us. We could only go on Preparation Day, which was Tuesday. That took some work, but I was able to attend every month of the mission (except for some months where some missionaries had abused the privilege and all missionaries lost temple attendance options for three months). Getting to the temple was within 1 hour for every area in which I served.

I lived in Branson Missouri for a couple of years. Our closest temple for Branson was the St. Louis Missouri Temple. That drive was at least 4 hours one way, often 4 1/2 hours. That required an entire day to be set aside and planned to drive, attend, and return home. Never missed a month in Branson. I sealed my Jonas grandparents together in St. Louis Missouri Temple. The Bentonville Arkansas Temple has been constructed much closer at about 2 hours. The Springfield Missouri Temple will be less than an hour away from Branson.

Amanda and I lived in Richmond Virginia for a couple of years. Our closest temple for Richmond was the Washington D.C. Temple. That drive was between 4 and 5 hours away, depending on beltway traffic. We would often go up and spend Friday night with family, attend the temple that night or in the morning, and then make our way back home. Washington D.C. Temple was closed for a bit, so to make the monthly trip, we had to go to the Raleigh North Carolina Temple. That was almost a 4 hour drive one direction. The new Richmond Virginia Temple is just outside the first neighborhood we lived in and within 10 minutes of the second neighborhood we lived.

When we moved back to Idaho, the Twin Falls Idaho Temple had been dedicated. That dropped the 2 to 2 1/2 hour drive time for all those temples to less than an hour, usually between 50-60 minutes. But it still takes time and planning to ensure I get there every month. This is double now that we also have a commitment to see that Aliza and Hiram are able to attend at least monthly.

Now, with the dedication of the Burley Idaho Temple in January, the temple will be between 5 to 6 minutes away.

Now I have to reevaluate. It seems the once a month commitment is not enough. I think that will remain the absolute minimum going forward for the rest of my life. It also seems I have no reason to not attend to at least one ordinance in the temple at least every week.

To show my gratitude to our Father and our Savior, I intend to attend the Burley Idaho Temple at least daily for the first 30 days it is open after dedication. Which isn’t as much as it seems if you consider it is not open on Sunday, Monday, or Thursday. Still working out what happens after the first 30 days.

For the last three weeks I have found myself regularly humming The Spirit of God and also muttering the Hosanna Shout under my breath. I am looking forward to the dedication of the Burley Idaho Temple on 11 January 2026!