Decision: In re Jarred A. Sprague and Elizabeth J. Sprague, Case No. 12-41099-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 18 December 2013)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtors: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: Alexandra O. Caval, Meridian, Idaho
Background
Jarred and Elizabeth Sprague filed a Chapter 13 petition on 2 August 2012. Their plan was confirmed on 12 October 2012, and the bar date for non-governmental creditors to file proofs of claim passed on 3 December 2012. Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (“FRBP”) 3004, the Debtors or Trustee had an additional 30 days — until 2 January 2013 — to file a proof of claim on behalf of any creditor that failed to do so.
The debt at issue arose in May 2009, when U.S. Bank closed Ms. Sprague’s bank account after a scam check deposited into the account bounced. Neither U.S. Bank nor its collection assignee, National Law Group (“NLG”), reported the resulting deficiency to any credit reporting agency, and neither contacted Ms. Sprague after the account was closed. When the Debtors compiled their bankruptcy schedules, they relied heavily on their credit reports — which showed no debt to U.S. Bank — and the obligation was omitted entirely from their filings.
In August 2013 — more than a year after the bar date — NLG contacted Ms. Sprague’s employer seeking to collect. Upon learning of the omitted debt, the Debtors promptly amended Schedule F to list U.S. Bank and NLG as creditors, served them with notice of the bankruptcy, and filed a motion to enlarge the time to file a proof of claim on their behalf under FRBP 3004 and FRBP 9006(b)(1).
The Trustee’s Objection
Trustee objected on several grounds. First, she argued the Debtors had not met the “excusable neglect” standard required under FRBP 9006(b)(1) to justify enlarging the FRBP 3004 deadline after its expiration. Relying on In re Schuster, 428 B.R. 833 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2010) — the only reported decision she could locate addressing this precise issue — the Trustee argued that the Debtors’ reason for delay was insufficient, as the account closure in 2009 should have put Ms. Sprague on notice that a claim might exist.
Second, the Trustee argued that granting the motion would prejudice the existing pool of unsecured creditors, who held approximately $37,894 in claims and whose pro-rata distributions would be reduced by the addition of a new creditor more than a year into the plan. She further contended that the omitted creditor itself would be prejudiced because its debt would be discharged upon plan completion — a result she argued was impermissible under 11 U.S.C. §§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(3), which exclude from Chapter 13 discharge debts that are neither listed nor scheduled in time to permit a timely proof of claim.
The Debtors’ Brief
Debtors filed a detailed brief through their counsel addressing each of the Trustee’s arguments.
On the procedural question, Debtors’ counsel confirmed that FRBP 3004’s deadline, unlike FRBP 3002(c)’s creditor bar date, is not enumerated in FRBP 9006(b)(3)’s list of deadlines that can only be extended under their own specific conditions. FRBP 9006(b)(1) therefore applies, and the Court may enlarge the FRBP 3004 deadline upon a showing of excusable neglect.
On excusable neglect, Debtors distinguished Schuster on its facts. In Schuster, the debtor had purchased appliances on credit — physical items that provided tangible, ongoing reminders of an unpaid debt — yet still claimed to have forgotten the obligation. Here, by contrast, the Debtors had no collateral, no invoices, no collection contacts, and no credit report entry to put them on notice. Ms. Sprague did not merely forget a debt she knew existed — she was genuinely unaware that any debt was owed. Upon learning of it, she and her husband acted immediately. Debtors’ counsel also identified three unreported decisions from the District of Utah in which courts had granted similar enlargements under comparable circumstances.
On the Trustee’s standing to seek a non-dischargeability determination, Debtors argued that the Trustee lacked both constitutional and prudential standing to raise a dischargeability objection on behalf of a specific creditor. Dischargeability is a particularized right belonging to the individual creditor, not a general estate matter the Trustee may assert.
On dischargeability itself, Debtors argued that § 523(a)(3) would not apply if the Court granted the enlargement. If the time to file a proof of claim on behalf of NLG were enlarged under FRBP 9006(b)(1), the claim would be deemed timely filed under FRBP 3004, included in the plan’s pro-rata distribution to general unsecured creditors, and “provided for” under the plan within the meaning of § 1328(a). The harm § 523(a)(3) is designed to prevent — a creditor being denied both payment and discharge — would not exist.
The Court’s Ruling
Judge Pappas granted the Debtors’ motion in its entirety. Applying the four-factor equitable test from Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380 (1993), the Court found that each factor weighed in the Debtors’ favor.
On prejudice, the Court found the impact on other unsecured creditors to be minimal. The omitted claim was approximately $1,500 in a pool of roughly $37,894 in unsecured debt — a modest reduction in pro-rata distributions that no creditor had objected to. As for the omitted creditor itself, the Court found it would actually benefit from having its claim filed and paid, rather than being left entirely outside the plan.
On the length and reason for delay, the Court found the delay understandable and outside the Debtors’ reasonable control. The creditor had made no contact for over four years, reported nothing to credit agencies, and provided no basis for the Debtors to know the debt existed. Upon learning of it, the Debtors acted promptly.
On good faith, the Court found no basis to question it — a conclusion the Trustee herself did not dispute.
The Court also expressly disagreed with the Trustee’s dischargeability argument, declining to follow Schuster on that point. Because the Court was enlarging the time to file a proof of claim under 11 U.S.C. § 501(c) and FRBP 3004 and 9006(b)(1), the creditor’s claim would be treated as timely filed. The Court doubted that §§ 1328(a)(2) and 523(a)(3)(A) compelled a contrary result under those circumstances, though it declined to rule definitively on the discharge issue as it was not formally before it.
The Order gave the Debtors fourteen days from 18 December 2013 to file the proof of claim for U.S. Bank.
Why This Matters
1. FRBP 9006(b)(1) can enlarge the FRBP 3004 deadline. Unlike the creditor bar date under FRBP 3002(c) — which is expressly restricted from enlargement except under its own terms by FRBP 9006(b)(3) — FRBP 3004’s debtor/trustee claim-filing window is not enumerated in FRBP 9006(b)(3). Courts therefore retain discretion to enlarge it upon a showing of excusable neglect. This is a critical distinction practitioners must understand when an omitted creditor surfaces mid-case.
2. Excusable neglect is highly fact-specific. The contrast between this case and Schuster illustrates how much the reason for delay matters in the excusable neglect analysis under Pioneer. A debtor who genuinely lacked knowledge of a debt — with no collateral, no billing, and no credit report entry — is in a materially different position than one who simply forgot about a known obligation.
3. Acting promptly upon discovery is essential. The Debtors’ immediate response — amending their schedules, serving the creditor, and filing the motion — was central to the Court’s good faith finding. Delay after discovery would have significantly weakened the equitable case for enlargement.
4. The Trustee lacks standing to raise dischargeability on behalf of a single creditor. A Chapter 13 trustee does not have constitutional or prudential standing to seek a dischargeability determination on behalf of a specific creditor. That creditor’s own silence — it filed no objection — reinforced the point.
5. Timely filing cures the § 523(a)(3) problem. Where a court enlarges the FRBP 3004 deadline and the debtor files a proof of claim on the omitted creditor’s behalf, that claim becomes timely for plan purposes. The debt is then “provided for” under § 1328(a), resolving the non-dischargeability concern under § 523(a)(3). Inclusion in the plan is the better outcome for all parties.
Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 12-41099-JDP, Doc. 54 (Bankr. D. Idaho 18 December 2013)
Order Granting Motion: Doc. 55 (Bankr. D. Idaho 18 December 2013)
Sagacity 