Decision: In re Relna James DeVries and Kathryn Lee DeVries, Case No. 13-41591-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 28 Apr. 2015)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtors: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: Holly Roark, Office of Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Background
Relna and Kathryn DeVries filed a Chapter 13 petition on 27 December 2013. Their amended plan, confirmed on 19 May 2014, provided that all allowed tax claims would be paid in full. The IRS timely filed a proof of claim for taxes owed for the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The deadline for governmental units to file proofs of claim was 25 June 2014.
The Debtors filed their 2013 federal income tax returns in April 2014, which showed they owed $1,021 to the IRS for the 2013 tax year. The Idaho Tax Commission filed its own proof of claim for the $84 in state taxes owed for 2013 the day after plan confirmation. The IRS, however, did not file a claim for the 2013 federal taxes, nor did it amend its existing claim to include them. Within 30 days of the 25 June 2014 governmental bar date — as permitted by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 — the Debtors filed a proof of claim on behalf of the IRS for the $1,021 in 2013 taxes.
The Trustee’s Objection
The Trustee objected to the Debtors’ proof of claim. The Trustee represented that it was allegedly filed at the IRS’s own request, and that the IRS did not wish to have the 2013 tax debt paid through the plan as a § 1305 claim.
The Trustee’s objection rested on 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), which governs postpetition claims in Chapter 13 cases. That provision permits a proof of claim to be filed by “any entity that holds a claim against the debtor … for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending.” The Trustee argued that the Debtors’ 2013 federal income taxes became payable during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, making them a § 1305 postpetition claim, and that under the plain language of § 1305 only the creditor holding the claim — the IRS — was authorized to file a proof of claim for it. The Debtors’ attempt to file on the IRS’s behalf was therefore improper and the claim should be disallowed in its entirety.
The Debtors’ Response
Debtors filed a response through their counsel arguing that the 2013 tax debt was properly treated as a prepetition claim and that they were authorized to file the proof of claim under § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004.
Debtors did not rely on § 1305 as their filing authority. Instead, they argued that the 2013 tax obligation was a prepetition claim — or should be treated as one — and that the ordinary debtor claim-filing mechanism of § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 therefore applied. On the question of when the claim arose, Debtors urged the Court to apply the “fair contemplation” or “prepetition relationship” test articulated in In re Dixon, 295 B.R. 226 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003). Under that approach, a claim arises prepetition if there was a prepetition relationship between the debtor and the creditor such that a possible claim was within the creditor’s fair contemplation at the time of filing. The IRS and the Debtors had precisely such a relationship: the Debtors were taxpayers, the IRS was their taxing authority, and 361 of the 365 days of the 2013 tax year had elapsed before the petition was filed. The IRS’s claim for 2013 taxes was fully within its fair contemplation at the time of filing, Debtors argued, making it a prepetition claim subject to the ordinary rules permitting debtors to file on a creditor’s behalf.
Debtors also invoked 11 U.S.C. § 502(i), which provides that a postpetition claim for taxes entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8) shall be treated as if it had arisen before the petition date. On that theory, even if the 2013 taxes technically arose postpetition, § 502(i) mandated that they be treated as prepetition claims, restoring the Debtors’ authority to file under § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004.
The Trustee’s Reply
The Trustee replied that Ninth Circuit authority resolved the question directly and foreclosed the Michigan court’s “fair contemplation” test. Relying on Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009), the Trustee argued that taxes owed for a given tax year do not “become payable” — and therefore do not arise as a § 1305 postpetition claim — until the close of that tax year. Because the DeVries filed their petition before the close of 2013, the 2013 taxes became payable only after the petition date and were a postpetition claim that only the IRS could properly file. The Trustee further noted that allowing the improperly filed claim would prejudice general unsecured creditors, whose pro-rata distributions would be reduced by the addition of a priority tax claim.
The Court’s Ruling
Judge Pappas sustained the Trustee’s objection and disallowed the Debtors’ proof of claim in its entirety.
The Court addressed § 502(i) first and found it dispositive against the Debtors. Section 502(i) applies only to postpetition tax claims entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), which affords priority to income taxes for which the applicable return was due within three years before the petition date. The DeVries’ 2013 federal income tax return was not due until 15 April 2014 — after their 27 December 2013 petition date. Because the return due date fell outside the three-year lookback period, the 2013 taxes were not entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and § 502(i) therefore had no application. The Court drew support from the Ninth Circuit BAP’s analysis in In re Jones, 420 B.R. 506 (9th Cir. BAP 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 657 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2011), which explained that a postpetition income tax obligation whose return is due postpetition cannot invoke priority status under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) and thus falls outside § 502(i)’s reach entirely.
The Court then turned to § 1305(a)(1) and rejected the Debtors’ “fair contemplation” argument. Binding Ninth Circuit precedent, not the Michigan court’s test, controlled the analysis. Under In re Joye, taxes become “payable” for purposes of § 1305(a)(1) when they are “capable of being paid.” The Ninth Circuit further established in In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995), that a tax on income is “incurred” on the last day of the income period. Because federal income taxes are assessed by the calendar year, the DeVries’ 2013 taxes were incurred at midnight on 31 December 2013 — after the petition was filed. Both the incurrence and the payability of the 2013 taxes therefore occurred postpetition, placing them squarely within § 1305(a)(1).
The Court also examined the interplay between § 502(i) and § 1305(a)(1) as analyzed in In re Joye, which drew on Collier on Bankruptcy for the proposition that § 502(i) applies to taxes incurred prepetition that do not come due until after the petition is filed, while taxes incurred postpetition can be treated only as postpetition claims under § 1305. Because the 2013 taxes were incurred postpetition under the Pacific-Atlantic rule, § 502(i) offered the Debtors no relief in any event.
Having concluded that the 2013 taxes were a § 1305(a)(1) postpetition claim, the Court applied the well-established rule that postpetition claims under § 1305 may be offered for inclusion in a Chapter 13 plan only by the creditor that holds the claim. A debtor has no authority to force a postpetition creditor into the plan by filing a proof of claim on its behalf. The Trustee’s objection was sustained and the Debtors’ proof of claim disallowed.
Why This Matters
Section 502(i) does not reach postpetition taxes whose returns are due postpetition. The provision applies only to taxes entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) — which requires the return to have been due within three years before the petition date. An income tax return due after the petition date falls outside that window entirely. Practitioners should not assume § 502(i) will bridge the gap between a postpetition tax liability and prepetition claim treatment.
The Ninth Circuit’s “capable of being paid” standard governs when taxes become payable in the Ninth Circuit. Under In re Joye, the relevant inquiry for § 1305(a)(1) purposes is when the tax was capable of being paid — and under In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., income taxes are incurred on the last day of the tax year. A tax year that closes after the petition date produces a postpetition claim regardless of how many days of that year preceded the filing.
Only the creditor may file a § 1305 postpetition claim. Section 1305(a) grants the right to file a proof of claim for postpetition taxes exclusively to the entity that holds the claim. A debtor cannot invoke § 501(c) or Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 to file on a creditor’s behalf where the underlying obligation is a § 1305 postpetition claim rather than a prepetition one. The creditor’s silence is the creditor’s choice to make.
The IRS may decline plan treatment of a postpetition tax debt. This case illustrates that § 1305 is entirely creditor-driven. The Trustee’s objection represented that the IRS allegedly sought disallowance of the Debtors’ filing rather than simply declining to participate. A Chapter 13 debtor who owes postpetition taxes has no mechanism to compel inclusion of that debt in the plan over the IRS’s objection.
Debtors who owe taxes for a year that closes after their petition date should address the liability outside the plan. Where postpetition income taxes cannot be included in a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, the debt remains the debtor’s obligation to manage directly with the taxing authority. Counsel should advise clients of this reality at the outset and account for ongoing tax obligations in assessing the feasibility of the plan.
Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 13-41591-JDP, Doc. 57 (Bankr. D. Idaho 28 Apr. 2015)
Sagacity 