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In re Lugo

Decision: In re Jason Josue Lugo, Case No. 15-40121-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 25 Jun. 2015)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtor: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: Holly Roark, Office of Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho

Background

Jason Josue Lugo and his wife Lori married in 1996. In December 2003, Lugo acquired real property in Declo, Idaho, and in March 2004 conveyed it to himself and Lori by quitclaim deed. The couple built a home on the property that year and moved in with their family, establishing an automatic homestead exemption by virtue of their occupancy as a principal residence under Idaho Code § 55-1004(1).

In July 2012, Lugo moved out of the marital home due to irreconcilable differences. His family remained in the home. He did not record a declaration of non-abandonment. Under Idaho Code § 55-1006, six months of continuous vacancy creates a presumption of abandonment — meaning Lugo’s automatic homestead was presumed abandoned by January 2013. On 12 September 2013, a stipulated divorce decree was entered awarding Lori sole possession of the property, subject to the two existing mortgages and a $40,000 obligation to Lugo’s father. Under the decree, Lori was to refinance the mortgages within seven months and pay Lugo’s father in installments; if she could not refinance, the property was to be sold and the proceeds used to satisfy the parties’ debts. The decree did not expressly grant Lugo any continuing interest in the property. Pending refinance or sale, Lori was responsible for the first mortgage payments and Lugo for the second.

On 17 February 2015, before filing his bankruptcy petition later that same day, Lugo recorded a Declaration of Homestead on the Declo property with Cassia County. He then filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition claiming the property exempt as his homestead in the amount of $49,401.93 — the estimated equity — under Idaho Code §§ 55-1001, 55-1002, and 55-1003. His Chapter 13 plan proposed to sell the property and pay the secured creditors, with any nonexempt proceeds distributed to unsecured creditors. Lugo acknowledged he could not afford to continue making the second mortgage payments.

The Trustee’s Objection

The Trustee objected to the homestead exemption claim on two grounds: Lugo did not reside at the property — his petition listed his residence in Rupert, Idaho — and his Chapter 13 plan proposed to sell it, which the Trustee argued evidenced a lack of any intent to reside there. The Trustee contended that Lugo therefore did not qualify for the homestead exemption under either Idaho’s automatic or declared homestead provisions, and that the claim should be disallowed in its entirety.

The Debtor’s Response

Debtor’s counsel filed a response arguing that the homestead exemption was valid and that the Trustee had not met the burden of proof required to overcome it.

Counsel acknowledged that Lugo had vacated the property in 2012 and had not filed a declaration of non-abandonment, which created a rebuttable presumption of abandonment of the automatic homestead under Idaho Code § 55-1006. Counsel argued, however, that Lugo had done precisely what Idaho law provides as an alternative: he recorded a Declaration of Homestead with Cassia County, invoking the second track of homestead protection under Idaho Code § 55-1004. That provision permits an owner who is not currently occupying a property as a principal residence to establish a homestead by recorded declaration, provided the declaration states an intent to reside there. Lugo’s declaration did so, and the technical requirements of the statute were met.

On the plan-to-sell issue, counsel argued that the Trustee’s position ignored Idaho Code § 55-1008, which exempts proceeds from the voluntary sale of a homestead for up to one year when the debtor intends to acquire a new homestead. Lugo wished to preserve the equity in the property for use in acquiring a new home, and the homestead exemption should follow the proceeds accordingly.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Pappas sustained the Trustee’s objection and disallowed the homestead exemption.

The Court began by tracing the two tracks through which Idaho law permits a homestead to be established. The first — the automatic or “springing” homestead — arises by operation of law from the moment a debtor occupies property as a principal residence, without any filing or formality. Idaho Code § 55-1004(1). The second — the declared homestead — permits an owner who is not presently occupying property as a residence to establish a homestead by recording a declaration stating an intent to reside there. Idaho Code § 55-1004(2). Both tracks were relevant here.

Lugo had unquestionably established an automatic homestead when he moved into the Declo property in 2004. But he vacated in July 2012 without filing a declaration of non-abandonment, and under Idaho Code § 55-1006 that homestead was presumed abandoned by January 2013. No automatic homestead survived. Lugo therefore could not rely on the first track and turned to the second.

The recorded Declaration of Homestead was facially sufficient. It satisfied each technical requirement of Idaho Code § 55-1004(3): it stated an intent to reside on the property, included a legal description, and provided an estimated cash value, and it had been properly recorded before the bankruptcy petition was filed. Under normal circumstances, that would be enough. The declared homestead is a recognized and legitimate mechanism, and the Court acknowledged that recording a declaration before filing is a conventional and proper way to establish a homestead exemption.

But the Court held that satisfying the statutory checklist does not end the inquiry when the exemption is contested. When an objecting party challenges the declaration, the Court must look behind its face and assess the quality and genuineness of the proof supporting it — in particular, whether the stated intent to reside is real. Here, because the parties proceeded on stipulated facts alone, with no live testimony from Lugo, the record was fixed. And that record told a story that was flatly inconsistent with any genuine intent to reside at the Declo property.

The divorce decree, entered more than a year before the bankruptcy filing, awarded Lori sole possession of the property and contemplated only two outcomes: refinancing or sale. No scenario in the decree provided for Lugo’s return. His bankruptcy plan reinforced the same conclusion — it proposed to sell the property, and if the sale failed, to surrender it. Lugo acknowledged he could not afford the mortgage. Nothing in the record suggested any realistic pathway by which he could or would live at the Declo property again. The declaration’s statement of intent to reside, the Court concluded, was not supported by the facts.

The Court also rejected the § 55-1008 sale-proceeds argument. That provision exempts proceeds from the voluntary sale of a homestead for the purpose of acquiring a new homestead — but it presupposes a valid homestead exemption in the first place. Because no valid homestead had been established, there was nothing to carry forward into the proceeds. Moreover, the record contained no evidence that Lugo intended to use any sale proceeds to purchase a replacement homestead. The Court found his true aim was to preserve equity against distribution to unsecured creditors — an understandable goal, but not one the homestead statutes were designed to serve.

Why This Matters

  1. Idaho’s two-track homestead system offers a genuine alternative to the automatic exemption. When an owner vacates a property and loses the automatic homestead through presumed abandonment, Idaho Code § 55-1004 provides a second path: recording a declaration of intent to reside. That mechanism is legitimate and used, and a properly recorded declaration ordinarily establishes the exemption. This case illustrates, however, that the declared homestead is not a rubber stamp. When the exemption is contested, the Court will look beyond the four corners of the declaration and assess whether the stated intent is genuine.

  2. The divorce decree can be the most important document in the file. A stipulated divorce decree that awards possession of the property to the other spouse and contemplates only refinancing or sale effectively closes the door on any claimed intent to return. Where no scenario in the decree provides for the debtor’s residency, that decree will be powerful — perhaps decisive — evidence against the homestead claim. Counsel evaluating a client’s homestead position after a divorce should read the decree carefully before advising that a recorded declaration will succeed.

  3. Failing to file a declaration of non-abandonment has lasting consequences. Idaho Code § 55-1006 gives a debtor who plans a long absence without intent to abandon the homestead a clear tool: record a declaration of non-abandonment. Lugo did not do so when he left in 2012, and by the time he filed for bankruptcy in 2015 the automatic homestead had been presumed abandoned for over two years. Practitioners advising clients who are leaving a marital home during separation or divorce proceedings should consider this step immediately.

  4. Live testimony on intent may be essential. The Court explicitly noted that because the parties stipulated to the facts and no live testimony was offered, Lugo had no opportunity to address his subjective intent to return to the property. Stipulated facts are efficient but inflexible — they cannot be supplemented after the fact. Where a homestead exemption contest turns on intent, practitioners should consider whether proceeding by stipulation forecloses testimony that might have been outcome-determinative.

  5. Idaho Code § 55-1008 requires both a valid underlying homestead and a genuine intent to acquire a replacement. The sale-proceeds exemption does not operate independently. It presupposes that the property being sold was validly exempt as a homestead. A debtor who cannot establish the underlying exemption cannot use § 55-1008 to protect sale proceeds. And even where the underlying exemption is valid, the proceeds exemption requires evidence of intent to use them to acquire a new homestead — a plan to sell, pay creditors, and retain equity does not qualify.

Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 15-40121-JDP, Doc. 32 (Bankr. D. Idaho 25 Jun. 2015)

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In re DeVries

Decision: In re Relna James DeVries and Kathryn Lee DeVries, Case No. 13-41591-JDP (Bankr. D. Idaho, 28 Apr. 2015)
Judge: Honorable Jim D. Pappas, United States Bankruptcy Judge
Counsel for Debtors: Paul Ross, Idaho Bankruptcy Law, Paul, Idaho
Chapter 13 Trustee: Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho
Trustee’s Counsel: Holly Roark, Office of Kathleen A. McCallister, Meridian, Idaho

Background

Relna and Kathryn DeVries filed a Chapter 13 petition on 27 December 2013. Their amended plan, confirmed on 19 May 2014, provided that all allowed tax claims would be paid in full. The IRS timely filed a proof of claim for taxes owed for the 2011 and 2012 tax years. The deadline for governmental units to file proofs of claim was 25 June 2014.

The Debtors filed their 2013 federal income tax returns in April 2014, which showed they owed $1,021 to the IRS for the 2013 tax year. The Idaho Tax Commission filed its own proof of claim for the $84 in state taxes owed for 2013 the day after plan confirmation. The IRS, however, did not file a claim for the 2013 federal taxes, nor did it amend its existing claim to include them. Within 30 days of the 25 June 2014 governmental bar date — as permitted by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 — the Debtors filed a proof of claim on behalf of the IRS for the $1,021 in 2013 taxes.

The Trustee’s Objection

The Trustee objected to the Debtors’ proof of claim. The Trustee represented that it was allegedly filed at the IRS’s own request, and that the IRS did not wish to have the 2013 tax debt paid through the plan as a § 1305 claim.

The Trustee’s objection rested on 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), which governs postpetition claims in Chapter 13 cases. That provision permits a proof of claim to be filed by “any entity that holds a claim against the debtor … for taxes that become payable to a governmental unit while the case is pending.” The Trustee argued that the Debtors’ 2013 federal income taxes became payable during the pendency of the bankruptcy case, making them a § 1305 postpetition claim, and that under the plain language of § 1305 only the creditor holding the claim — the IRS — was authorized to file a proof of claim for it. The Debtors’ attempt to file on the IRS’s behalf was therefore improper and the claim should be disallowed in its entirety.

The Debtors’ Response

Debtors filed a response through their counsel arguing that the 2013 tax debt was properly treated as a prepetition claim and that they were authorized to file the proof of claim under § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004.

Debtors did not rely on § 1305 as their filing authority. Instead, they argued that the 2013 tax obligation was a prepetition claim — or should be treated as one — and that the ordinary debtor claim-filing mechanism of § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 therefore applied. On the question of when the claim arose, Debtors urged the Court to apply the “fair contemplation” or “prepetition relationship” test articulated in In re Dixon, 295 B.R. 226 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2003). Under that approach, a claim arises prepetition if there was a prepetition relationship between the debtor and the creditor such that a possible claim was within the creditor’s fair contemplation at the time of filing. The IRS and the Debtors had precisely such a relationship: the Debtors were taxpayers, the IRS was their taxing authority, and 361 of the 365 days of the 2013 tax year had elapsed before the petition was filed. The IRS’s claim for 2013 taxes was fully within its fair contemplation at the time of filing, Debtors argued, making it a prepetition claim subject to the ordinary rules permitting debtors to file on a creditor’s behalf.

Debtors also invoked 11 U.S.C. § 502(i), which provides that a postpetition claim for taxes entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8) shall be treated as if it had arisen before the petition date. On that theory, even if the 2013 taxes technically arose postpetition, § 502(i) mandated that they be treated as prepetition claims, restoring the Debtors’ authority to file under § 501(c) and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004.

The Trustee’s Reply

The Trustee replied that Ninth Circuit authority resolved the question directly and foreclosed the Michigan court’s “fair contemplation” test. Relying on Joye v. Franchise Tax Bd. (In re Joye), 578 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2009), the Trustee argued that taxes owed for a given tax year do not “become payable” — and therefore do not arise as a § 1305 postpetition claim — until the close of that tax year. Because the DeVries filed their petition before the close of 2013, the 2013 taxes became payable only after the petition date and were a postpetition claim that only the IRS could properly file. The Trustee further noted that allowing the improperly filed claim would prejudice general unsecured creditors, whose pro-rata distributions would be reduced by the addition of a priority tax claim.

The Court’s Ruling

Judge Pappas sustained the Trustee’s objection and disallowed the Debtors’ proof of claim in its entirety.

The Court addressed § 502(i) first and found it dispositive against the Debtors. Section 502(i) applies only to postpetition tax claims entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), which affords priority to income taxes for which the applicable return was due within three years before the petition date. The DeVries’ 2013 federal income tax return was not due until 15 April 2014 — after their 27 December 2013 petition date. Because the return due date fell outside the three-year lookback period, the 2013 taxes were not entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i), and § 502(i) therefore had no application. The Court drew support from the Ninth Circuit BAP’s analysis in In re Jones, 420 B.R. 506 (9th Cir. BAP 2009), aff’d on other grounds, 657 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2011), which explained that a postpetition income tax obligation whose return is due postpetition cannot invoke priority status under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) and thus falls outside § 502(i)’s reach entirely.

The Court then turned to § 1305(a)(1) and rejected the Debtors’ “fair contemplation” argument. Binding Ninth Circuit precedent, not the Michigan court’s test, controlled the analysis. Under In re Joye, taxes become “payable” for purposes of § 1305(a)(1) when they are “capable of being paid.” The Ninth Circuit further established in In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., 64 F.3d 1292 (9th Cir. 1995), that a tax on income is “incurred” on the last day of the income period. Because federal income taxes are assessed by the calendar year, the DeVries’ 2013 taxes were incurred at midnight on 31 December 2013 — after the petition was filed. Both the incurrence and the payability of the 2013 taxes therefore occurred postpetition, placing them squarely within § 1305(a)(1).

The Court also examined the interplay between § 502(i) and § 1305(a)(1) as analyzed in In re Joye, which drew on Collier on Bankruptcy for the proposition that § 502(i) applies to taxes incurred prepetition that do not come due until after the petition is filed, while taxes incurred postpetition can be treated only as postpetition claims under § 1305. Because the 2013 taxes were incurred postpetition under the Pacific-Atlantic rule, § 502(i) offered the Debtors no relief in any event.

Having concluded that the 2013 taxes were a § 1305(a)(1) postpetition claim, the Court applied the well-established rule that postpetition claims under § 1305 may be offered for inclusion in a Chapter 13 plan only by the creditor that holds the claim. A debtor has no authority to force a postpetition creditor into the plan by filing a proof of claim on its behalf. The Trustee’s objection was sustained and the Debtors’ proof of claim disallowed.

Why This Matters

  1. Section 502(i) does not reach postpetition taxes whose returns are due postpetition. The provision applies only to taxes entitled to priority under § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) — which requires the return to have been due within three years before the petition date. An income tax return due after the petition date falls outside that window entirely. Practitioners should not assume § 502(i) will bridge the gap between a postpetition tax liability and prepetition claim treatment.

  2. The Ninth Circuit’s “capable of being paid” standard governs when taxes become payable in the Ninth Circuit. Under In re Joye, the relevant inquiry for § 1305(a)(1) purposes is when the tax was capable of being paid — and under In re Pacific-Atlantic Trading Co., income taxes are incurred on the last day of the tax year. A tax year that closes after the petition date produces a postpetition claim regardless of how many days of that year preceded the filing.

  3. Only the creditor may file a § 1305 postpetition claim. Section 1305(a) grants the right to file a proof of claim for postpetition taxes exclusively to the entity that holds the claim. A debtor cannot invoke § 501(c) or Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3004 to file on a creditor’s behalf where the underlying obligation is a § 1305 postpetition claim rather than a prepetition one. The creditor’s silence is the creditor’s choice to make.

  4. The IRS may decline plan treatment of a postpetition tax debt. This case illustrates that § 1305 is entirely creditor-driven. The Trustee’s objection represented that the IRS allegedly sought disallowance of the Debtors’ filing rather than simply declining to participate. A Chapter 13 debtor who owes postpetition taxes has no mechanism to compel inclusion of that debt in the plan over the IRS’s objection.

  5. Debtors who owe taxes for a year that closes after their petition date should address the liability outside the plan. Where postpetition income taxes cannot be included in a confirmed Chapter 13 plan, the debt remains the debtor’s obligation to manage directly with the taxing authority. Counsel should advise clients of this reality at the outset and account for ongoing tax obligations in assessing the feasibility of the plan.


Full Decision: Available on PACER, Case No. 13-41591-JDP, Doc. 57 (Bankr. D. Idaho 28 Apr. 2015)

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